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	<title>Allicient &#187; SHA-3 Zoo</title>
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	<link>http://www.allicient.co.uk</link>
	<description>Peter Maxwell's Information Security Site</description>
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		<title>Sgàil Revisions &amp; Corrections</title>
		<link>http://www.allicient.co.uk/2009/01/21/sgail-revisions-corrections/</link>
		<comments>http://www.allicient.co.uk/2009/01/21/sgail-revisions-corrections/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2009 00:59:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>peter</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Cryptography]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AHS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cryptology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hash algorithm]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hash competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NIST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[secure hash algorithm]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sgàil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SHA-3]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SHA-3 Zoo]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.allicient.co.uk/?p=104</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Well, its finally been done &#8211; Sgàil has been updated to fix the error described in this post which allowed second pre-image and collision attacks. An error in the reference implementation has been remedied, and a number of typographical corrections have been made to the specification. The known answer tests and intermediate value results have [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, its finally been done &#8211; Sgàil has been updated to fix the error described in <a href="http://www.allicient.co.uk/2008/11/05/aww-psh/" rel='nofollow'>this post</a> which allowed second pre-image and collision attacks.  An error in the reference implementation has been remedied, and a number of typographical corrections have been made to the specification.  The known answer tests and intermediate value results have also been regenerated.</p>
<p>Although version 0.4 is considered to be immune to the previous design error and was submitted to NIST, it has not yet been approved/rejected as an official change.  Updates will be posted as they happen.</p>
<p>Changelogs have been included in the Supporting_Documentation directory.</p>
<p>The performance of the reference implementation has dropped from 62 cycles/byte to 71 cycles/byte in asymptopic behaviour due to the corrections made to the key schedule.  It is expected that an optimised version can improve this to at least 40 cycles/byte; I&#8217;m looking at coding this in the near future.</p>
<p>UPDATED 11th December 2009: I really should have updated this about six months ago; the corrections were not accepted by NIST and Sgàil did <strong>not</strong> progress to Round 2.</p>
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		<title>Aww, p*sh! [Sgàil: trivial collision in original submission]</title>
		<link>http://www.allicient.co.uk/2008/11/05/aww-psh/</link>
		<comments>http://www.allicient.co.uk/2008/11/05/aww-psh/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2008 17:45:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>peter</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Cryptography]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AHS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collision]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cryptology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hash algorithm]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hash competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NIST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[second pre-image]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[secure hash algorithm]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sgàil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SHA-3]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SHA-3 Zoo]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.allicient.co.uk/?p=73</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Sgàil, my submission to NIST&#8217;s SHA-3 competition, unfortunately has an error in it which makes finding a collision or second pre-image trivial.  The error crept in when I&#8217;d decided to change the key schedule late on from being a tree structure to a simple double block processing. The measure which had originally protected the tree [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sgàil, my submission to NIST&#8217;s SHA-3 competition, unfortunately has an error in it which makes finding a collision or second pre-image trivial.  The error crept in when I&#8217;d decided to change the key schedule late on from being a tree structure to a simple double block processing.</p>
<p>The measure which had originally protected the tree structure from block interchanges &#8211; the preliminary key &#8211; was unique for each 2048-bit block.  Unfortunately when redesigning the algorithm, I&#8217;d neglected to process a preliminary key for each 2048-bit block and instead processed a single preliminary key for each 4096-bit block.  The process where the 4096-bit block is reduced to the 2048-bit principle key uses the same preliminary key for both 2048-bit halves of the 4096-bit block, where they should have been different.  Hence the 2048-bit input pair is interchangable.</p>
<p>The resolution is to process a preliminary key for each 2048-bit input block and update the block counter at each 2048-bit input block rather than at each 4096-bit block.  The performance wouldn&#8217;t be significantly altered.  However since the submission deadline has now lapsed, I doubt any modifications will be accepted.</p>
<p>The following code generates a collision:</p>
<p>&#8212;&#8212;-</p>
<p>int main() {</p>
<p>u8 data__a[ SGAIL__INPUT_BLOCK__SIZE * 2 ];<br />
u8 data__b[ SGAIL__INPUT_BLOCK__SIZE * 2 ];<br />
u8 result__a[ 64 ];<br />
u8 result__b[ 64 ];</p>
<p>memset( data__a, 0, SGAIL__INPUT_BLOCK__SIZE * 2  );<br />
memset( data__b, 0, SGAIL__INPUT_BLOCK__SIZE * 2  );</p>
<p>data__a[ 0 ] = 1;<br />
data__a[ 256 ] = 2;</p>
<p>data__b[ 0 ] = 2;<br />
data__b[ 256 ] = 1;</p>
<p>Hash( 512, data__a, ( SGAIL__INPUT_BLOCK__SIZE * 2 ) * 8, result__a );<br />
Hash( 512, data__b, ( SGAIL__INPUT_BLOCK__SIZE * 2 ) * 8, result__b );</p>
<p>do__display_512_bit_hash__byte_wise( result__a );<br />
do__display_512_bit_hash__byte_wise( result__b );</p>
<p>}<br />
&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;</p>
<p>I will post a revision of Sgàil in the next few days with the error fixed, although I don&#8217;t know of its applicability as concerns the SHA-3 competition.</p>
<p>UPDATED 21st November 2008: Ok, maybe a bit more than a few days, keep getting side-tracked.  Will upload new revision once have fixed the specification document.</p>
<p>UPDATED 21st January 2009: Version 0.4 has been released <a href="http://www.allicient.co.uk/2009/01/21/sgail-revisions-corrections/" rel='nofollow'>here</a> which corrects this error&#8230;. enjoy <img src='http://img.allicient.co.uk/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_wink.gif' alt=';-)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
<p>UPDATED 12th April 2010: Added [] extra meaning in title.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>First Blood in SHA-3 Competition. [&#039;WaMM&#039; submission has collision]</title>
		<link>http://www.allicient.co.uk/2008/11/05/first-blood-in-sha-3-competition/</link>
		<comments>http://www.allicient.co.uk/2008/11/05/first-blood-in-sha-3-competition/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2008 02:07:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>peter</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Cryptography]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[abacus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ARIRANG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AURORA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BLAKE]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blender]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blue Midnight Wish]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boole]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cheetah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CHI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CRUNCH]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cryptographic hash]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CubeHash]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DCH]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dynamic SHA]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[ECHO]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[FSB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fugue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Grøstl]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Keccak]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Luffa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LUX]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Maraca]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MCSSHA-3]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MD6]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MeshHash]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mifare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NaSHA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NIST]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Oyster card]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Skein]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spectral Hash]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[SWIFFTX]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tangle]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Twister]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vortex]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[WaMM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Waterfall]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.allicient.co.uk/?p=69</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[NIST hasn&#8217;t even published the complete and proper candidates, but there&#8217;s already a full break (second pre-image) of one of the candidate hash algorithms in the SHA-3 competition, pretty exciting, huh?  The &#8220;WaMM&#8221; hash algorithm is the first to fall, see here for more info.  There&#8217;s also been an attack on another of the submissions, [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>NIST hasn&#8217;t even published the complete and proper candidates, but there&#8217;s already a full break (second pre-image) of one of the candidate hash algorithms in the SHA-3 competition, pretty exciting, huh?  The &#8220;WaMM&#8221; hash algorithm is the first to fall, see <a href="http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/WaMM" rel='nofollow'>here</a> for more info.  There&#8217;s also been an attack on another of the submissions, <a href="http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/EnRUPT" rel='nofollow'>EnRUPT</a>.  A list of some (I say some, there&#8217;s quite a lot on the list) of the candidates can be found at <a href="http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/The_SHA-3_Zoo" rel='nofollow'>the SHA-3 zoo</a>.</p>
<p>In this type of process, such a complete break so early on is certainly a good indicator that the process is working as intended &#8211; and getting good involvement.  It also serves as a stark warning to those who would use a home-grown crypto scheme in a commercial product without full peer-review of their algorithm, the consequences of which are no less apparent than the failure of the ubiqutous <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/08/hacking_mifare.html" rel='nofollow'>Mifare classic</a>, used for example in the Oyster card in London.</p>
<p>UPDATED 12th April 2010: Added [] extra meaning in title.</p>
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